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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
There has been no established trend in other states to effectuate
similar results except in Pennsylvania 7 and Maryland. 8 However,
these cases will undoubtedly have a proper effect in that it will focus
attention on the overall aspects of attempting to draw legal instru-
ments not only in the light of their immediate purpose, but to give
adequate consideration to the taxation problems which may arise in
future enforcement of the instruments.
L.W.
TORTS - INTERFERENCE WITH ADVANTAGEOUS RELATIONS -
TRADE UNIONS-SELECTIVE TRAINING AND SERVICE ACT Or 1940.-
The plaintiff, Roscoe Williams, exercising his statutory right created
by the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, § 8, 50 U. S. C. A.
App. § 308, within the prescribed ninety days after discharge, re-
claimed his job with defendant, Sinclair Refining Company, that he
had left upon entry into the armed services. The defendant com-
pany was desirous of honoring the plaintiff's request; however, the
Oil Workers International Union, which was under contract with
the defendant, through a legally constituted committee, protested his
receiving the seniority provided for by the Veterans' Act. The issue
was submitted to the Board of Arbitrators, a decision being rendered
against the plaintiff who was not present at the arbitration. Williams
brought this action to recover damages in the amount of the difference
between wages he would have earned had his seniority rights been
recognized and the earnings actually received. The Sinclair Refining
Company has impleaded the Oil Workers International Union, as a
third party defendant, charging interference by the union which pre-
vented the defendant company from recognizing the plaintiff's sen-
iority rights and deprived him of the wages he would have received
in recognition thereof. Held, judgment for plaintiff ordered against
the third party defendant in the amount demanded. Williams v.
Sinclair Refining Co., 74 F. Supp. 139 (N. D. Tex. 1947).
The court first considers Williams' right to bring this action,
and resolves the question in the plaintiff's favor. Since Williams was
not present at, nor invited to, the arbitration, where his claim for
recognition of seniority rights under the Veterans' Act was decided
against him, it is presumed that he was represented by the union which
was also the bargaining agent of the other claimant for the job. On
a familiar and settled principle of law, it cannot be said that Williams
had any representation at the arbitration, since the union could not
17 Laws of Pennsylvania, Apportionment Act of 1937, P. L. 2762.
Is Laws of Maryland 1937, c. 546.
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RECENT DECISIONS
fairly represent both claimants of the job. An agent cannot serve
two principals in regard to the same subject without full knowledge
and consent of both parties.1 By way of a descriptive but admittedly
crude illustration 2 and a consideration of the evidence, the court de-
cides that sufficient pressure was present to justify the defendant
company in heeding the union's order and not recognizing the claim
made by plaintiff Williams. The last proposition which warranted
consideration of the court was raised, by the defendant's charge of
interference on the part of the union, thus preventing the company
from recognizing the plaintiff's claim. Here, the court resorts to the
ancient doctrine of Lumley v. Gye, the proposition of law laid down
in that well known case being as follows: It is an actionable wrong
for a third party without justification to induce a party to a contract
to break his agreement.3 Supplementing the above, it has been held
that there is no sufficient justification where the end sought to be
attained is to cause the employee to surrender a claim or to prevent
him from earning money. 4 Applying the principles just set forth,
the conclusion arrived at is that Williams' claim for restoration to
his old job with recognition of his seniority rights would have been
granted had there been no interference by the union.
Since shortly before the beginning of the twentieth century, the
trend in the law as respects labor unions has been to do away with
the older outlook of the courts which considered unions undesirable
and as outlaws.5 "This is an age of associations and unions, in all
departments of labor and business, for mutual benefit and protection.
Confined to proper limits, both as to ends and means, they are not
only lawful, but laudable." 6 Certain groups and individuals have
received a privilege, at the hands of the courts, to interfere with ad-
vantageous or contractual relationships, terminable at will, where the
benefit resulting from the interference is regarded as desirable by
society.7 The tendency of the courts in recent years, while giving
labor unions the new look, has been to classify them with these
I Audubon Bldg. Co. v. F. M. Andrews & Co., 187 Fed. 254 (C. C. A.
5th 1911); Chrystie v. Foster, 61 Fed. 551 (C. C. A. 2d 1894); Alger v.
Anderson, 78 Fed. 729 (C. C. M. D. Tenn. 1897) ; Glover v. Ames, 8 Fed. 351
(C. C. D. Me. 1881).
2 The court made reference to an old pioneer who was riding behind his
team, using his long whip to flick flies off the *oxen. A companion pointed to
a hornets' nest, and said, "Let me see you take your whip to that boy." The
pioneer replied, "No, they are organized."3 Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
4 London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526
(1903).5 PROSSER, ToRTs 1002 (1941).6 Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, 54 Minn. 223, -, 55 N. W. 1119, 1120 (1893).
7 Kelly v. Morris County Tractor Co., 2 N. J. Misc. 802, 126 Atl. 24
(1924); Kuryer Pub. Co. v. Messmer, 162 Wis. 565, 156 N. W. 948 (1916);
Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. v. Armstrong, 30 Okla. 134, 120 Pac. 952 (1911).
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groups, and to afford them the same privilege where possible.8
Unions have been permitted to strike in order to obtain better wages,9
to force the employer to perform his contracts 10 and to prevent dis-
crimination against union workmen."
As indicated in the principal case, the public policy which lies
behind the Veterans' Act must cause the union contract between the
Sinclair Refining Co. and the Oil Workers International Union to
give way to the discharged soldier. In David v. Boston , M. R. R.,
12
justice Connor, referring to the Act, decided that the veteran was
not to be barred from the right contemplated by the statute because
of a contract between the union and employer. In support of his
contention, he quotes from Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock and Repair
Corp., ". . . no . . . agreements between employers and unions can
cut down the service adjustment benefits which Congress has secured
the veteran under the Act." Is It was also stated that ". . . if the
bargaining agreement clashes with the provisions of the Selective
Service Act, then the former must yield." 14 These and other cases 15
indicate the strength of the public and social policy supporting
the statute. At the present time, when the interest in the returning
veteran has not yet completely disappeared, it is quite apparent that
this policy carries enough weight to offset that which lies behind the
privilege afforded to unions with regard to interference.
W. H. C.
TORTS-RES IPSA LoQUITuR-ExCLUSIVE CoNTROL.-Plaintiff,
while walking on the sidewalk past the defendant's hotel on V-J Day
wvas struck on the head and injured by an armchair which presumably
s Although the full effect of the Taft-Hartley Act is not yet known, there
is some indication that the pendulum has reached the top of its swing and may
be returning the unions a step or two towards the old look. See Labor Man-
agement Relations Act, 1947, 61 STAr. 136, 2 U. S. C. § 251 (Supp. 1947),
29 U. S. C. §§ 141-144, 151-167, 171-182, 185-188, 191-197, 50 U. S. C.
App. § 1509.
9 Roddy v. United Mine Workers of America, 41 Okla. 621, 139 Pac. 126
(1914); Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8,760, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac.
324 (1909) ; Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W. L. U. No. 131, 165 Ind.
421, 75 N. E. 877 (1905).
20 Spivak v. Wankofsky, 155 Misc. 530, 278 N. Y. Supp. 562 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
"United Chain Theatres v. Philadelphia M. P. M. 0., 50 F. 2d 189 (E. D.
Pa. 1931); Gill Engraving Co. v. Doerr, 214 Fed. 111 (S. D. N. Y. 1914).
12 71 F. Supp. 342, 347 (D. N. H. 1947).
I '328 U. S. 275, 285, 90 L. ed. 1230, 1240 (1946).
14 Olin Industries v. Barnett, 64 F. Supp. 722, 728 (S. D. Ill. 1946).
1 5 Meehan v. National Supply Co., 160 F. 2d 346 (C. C. A. 11th 1947);
Kay v. General Cable Corporation, 144 F. 2d 653 (C. C. A. 3d 1944) ; Lord
Mfg. Co. v. Nemenz, 65 F. Supp. 711 (W. D. Pa. 1946).
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